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differences of opinion, not only among writers"3 and individuals, but also on the Court.
NORMAN E. BURKE
Problems Resulting From Imposing Restrictions On
Subdivided Lots By Straw Man Conveyance
Gnau v. Kinlein'
In 1947, the appellants, Arthur Gnau and his wife, conveyed an unimproved eight acre tract of land to a straw
man by deed, reciting that the grantors had subdivided the
tract into 13 lots as shown on a plat filed with and expressly
made a part of the deed. It also stipulated that the entire
tract was to be subject to certain covenants and restrictions, including the restriction that the land shall be used
for private residence purposes only. The deed provided
that the covenants and restrictions would be binding on
all of the land, that they were to run with the land, and
be binding on the heirs, personal representatives, successors
or assigns of the parties, and that they should be performed
by and be enforceable by all persons owning, occupying or
having any interest in any of the land.
The straw man immediately reconveyed the entire tract
to the Gnaus subject to the same restrictions. On June 17,
1947, the above mentioned deeds and plat were duly recorded among the Land Records of Baltimore County. On
June 21 the Gnaus conveyed lot 9 on the plat by a deed
which neither included nor made reference to any of the
restrictive covenants. In 1954 the Gnaus repurchased lot
9 by a deed which made no mention of the covenants. In
1949 the Gnaus sold lots 1 and 2, but the deed contained
no covenants nor reference thereto. Shortly thereafter,
lots 7 and 8 were conveyed by a deed which provided that
these lots were to be held subject to the restrictive coy=There were two law review articles written on the Hoag case after
it had been decided in the state court, and the writers disagreed in their
conclusions. See Comment, supra, n. 17, 88 where the writer says:
"One reason, if not on authority, it seems . . . the defense of double
jeopardy should have been upheld in the principal case."
Of., Note, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 531, 535 (1956) where the writer said:
"The instant decision would appear to be sound." And also see note. ConstitutionalLaw - Successive Prosecutions of Same Defendant by State for
Crimes Arising Out of Same Occurrence Do Not Violate Fourteenth Amendment, 107 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 109 (1958), where the writer severely criticizes
the decision in the Ciucci case.
' 217 Md. 43, 141 A. 2d 492 (1958).
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enants set forth in the deed from the Gnaus to the straw
man. Lots 5 and 6 were conveyed in 1950 by deed making
no reference to the covenants, and the grantee three years
later by a similar deed transferred the property to its present owners. Later in 1950, lots 3 and 4 were conveyed by
deed subject to the restrictive covenants set forth in the
Gnau-straw man deed. Thus, in 1956, when this cause of
action arose, four of the eight lots which were held under
deeds from Gnau, the common grantor, were not expressly
made subject to any restrictive covenants.
In 1956, lots 9 through 13, which were either retained
or repurchased by the common grantor, were reclassified by
the Zoning Commissioner of Baltimore County from "A"
Residential to "E" Commercial, and Gnau procured a permit for, and erected, a sign proclaiming that a professional
building would be erected on the land. Thereupon the
owners of lots 1 and 2, 3 and 4, and 5 and 6 sought to enjoin
the Gnaus from proceeding directly or indirectly in violation of their express covenants, restrictions and agreements
relating to that property held by the Gnaus known as lots
9 through 13 of "Loch Knoll Manor". The Chancellor
granted the injunction.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that: (1) the
conveyance of a tract of land to a straw man subject to
restrictions, and its reconveyance to the grantors, subject
to the same restrictions, bound all of the land to all of the
restrictions, and after the first deed of one of the subdivided lots the common grantors no longer had power
unilaterally to remove the restrictions they had created, or
to avoid their full impact on the lots retained by them; (2)
all subsequent purchasers of the subdivided lots took with
constructive notice of the restrictions and were bound by
them; (3) a common scheme of development existed; (4)
the restrictions were not waived by virtue of trivial deviations from the specified restrictions by subsequent purchasers; and (5) the neighborhood had not changed so
substantially as to require a finding that the restrictions
were no longer worthwhile or significant. The first three
grounds are somewhat troublesome, and although the result of the principal case is desirable, considerable difficulty
is experienced in developing a legal basis which will justify
the result.
The Court said that the problem of whether a restrictive
covenant is binding on the grantor and grantees, as well
as whether a grantor intended to bind the land retained
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by him, is a question of intention, and felt that an intention
to bind all of the lots in the development, including those
retained by the grantor, was plainly expressed. This was
deduced merely from the words of the Gnau-straw man
conveyance. Judge Hammond relied upon the finding of
the Chancellor that a common scheme of development existed, without any discussion other than to say: "We think
the record clearly permitted the finding the chancellor
made ...."2 The Court felt there was no merit in the contention as to waiver or abandonment of the restrictions by
the individual lot owners, for the deviations alleged were
trivial. The Court also said that the neighborhood had not
changed completely or radically in that the area immediately surrounding the lots in question remained essentially
residential in character, although an intersection a short
distance away had become commercial.
In this case the Court did not discuss the relative legal
relationships of the individual complainants. It is submitted that the Court should have considered the doctrines
of merger and implied reciprocal servitudes to determine
if the individual complainants had any cause of action. It
can be argued that the only complainants in the principal
case with any standing in court are the owners of lots 3
and 4, that the owners of lots 1 and 2 may be estopped from
asserting any rights under the restrictive covenants by
virtue of the operation of the doctrine of merger, and that
the owners of lots 5 and 6 do not have sufficient grounds
to claim protection under the doctrine of implied reciprocal
servitudes.
Considering the problems in their chronological order,
it is necessary to discus the legal grounds upon which the
owners of lots 1 and 2 may base their claim. Where the
owner of a lot in a subdivision purchases his lot without
any lots having been previously sold subject to restrictions,
he must show three things in order to claim the benefit
of restrictions placed in subsequent deeds: (1) that the
benefit touches and concerns his lot; (2) that the grantor
intended a benefit to attach to said owner's lot, which may
be proved by (a) an express stipulation in the deed, or
(b) the existence of a uniform building scheme, or (c)
special circumstances showing an intention to benefit his
lot; and, (3) that he or his predecessor purchased the lot
from the developer in expectation that subsequent coyIbid., 50.
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enants would be created for the benefit of his lot.3 This
last may be proved by the existence of an express stipulation in his deed that these covenants will be inserted in
all future deeds, or by the fact that the subdivision was advertised or represented as restricted, and that he acted in
reliance upon such representation.'
In the principal case, the owner of lots 1 and 2 could
easily prove that the benefit touches and concerns his property, for uniform building restrictions in a residential area
are recognized to be beneficial to each subdivided lot, and
also that the common grantor intended for a benefit to attach to his lot, due to the existence of a general scheme
of development. The difficulty arises in proving that the land
was acquired with the expectation and understanding that
as a prior purchaser he would be entitled to the benefit of
subsequent equitable servitudes created by his grantor in
later sales of other lots.
It might be argued in the principal case that the purchaser of lots 1 and 2 knew of the restrictions in the straw
man conveyance and the development of a general scheme
at that time, relying upon the belief that these restrictions
were binding on all subsequent purchasers of lots from the
common grantor. This argument fails when it is realized
that whatever effect the restrictions may have had when
Gnau placed them in his deed to the straw man, they were
extinguished by virtue of the operation of the merger doctrine when the Gnaus reacquired title to the entire tract.
Therefore, such reliance was unjustifiable unless the Gnaus
recreated these restrictions by reference to them in their
subsequent sales of the lots. It should be noted also that
at the time of the purchase of lots 1 and 2, not only had
the restrictions been extinguished by merger, but lot 9 had
been sold free of any restrictions. The reasonable assumption at that time, therefore, would be that the common
grantor did not intend to subject the remaining lots to
uniform restrictions.
It is the general rule that the duration of a real covenant is coextensive only with the estate to which it is
annexed.5 A covenant therefore is extinguished when the
estate ceases,' when the covenant and estate become vested
8Summers

v. Beeler, 90 Md. 474, 45 A. 19 (1899).
' Bealmear v. Tippett, 145 Md. 568, 125 A. 806 (1924) ; 2 AMERICAN LAW
OF 'PROPERTY (1952) §9.30.
14 AM. JUR., Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, 484, §5.
6 Rector v. Waugh, 17 Mo. 13, 57 Am. Dec. 251 (1852).
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in one person, or where there is a reconveyance of the
land or estate to the covenantor.8 It is evident that
immediately after the conveyance to the straw man, Gnau
could not have enforced the covenants which he had imposed upon the tract in the straw man conveyance, for he
no longer had any interest in the property.' The covenants
were of no force or effect at that time. The next question
is whether the covenants were enforceable when the tract
was reconveyed to Gnau, the original grantor. The answer
must be in the negative, for it is clear that the revesting
of the covenantor with the same estate he had conveyed,
extinguishes all covenants running with the land.1" Therefore, after the reconveyance to the original grantor the
property could have been sold in toto or in part free and
7
Muscogee Manufacturing Co. v. Eagle & Phoenix Mills, 126 Ga. 210,
54 S.E. 1028, 1031 (1906).
8
Brown v. Metz, 33 Ill. 339, 85 Am. Dec. 277 (1864).
'It is a fundamental principle in equity pleading that to entitle a party
to sustain a bill, he must show an Interest in the subject of the suit, or
a right to the thing demanded, and proper title to institute -the suit concerning it. When an original grantor sells all of his property, he no longer
has any interest in the property and therefore cannot enforce restrictive
covenants which he has imposed on that property. See Foreman v. Sadler's
Executors, 114 Md. 574, 80 A. 298 (1911); Sellman v. Sellman, 63 Md.
520 (1885) ; Wood v. Stehrer, 119 Md. 143, 86 A. 128 (1912) ; Bealmear v.
Tippett, 145 Md. 568, 125 A. 806 (1924) ; BEST, THE LAW GOVERNING RESTRIC'rIONS AND RESTRIcTrIv COVENANTS (1934) 16.
10A real covenant imposing a servitude which runs with the land loses
its character as such and the servitude Is extinguished when all the land
affected by the covenant becomes vested in one and the same person. This
in legal contemplation works a dissolution of the servient and the dominant
tenements, and by merger both are swallowed up in the single ownership.
See 14 Am. Jur., Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, 642, 643, §§291
& 293; Spector v. Traster, 270 Mass. 545, 170 N.E. 567 (1930) ; Stevenson
v. Spivey, 132 Va. 115, 110 S.E. 367, 21 A.L.R. 1276 (1922) ; Craven County
v. First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 237 N.C. 502, 75 S.E. 2d 620 (1953);
2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY (1952) §9.32.
The following is a pertinent quote from 5 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944)
3288, §555:
"Merger"(1) The obligation arising out of a promise respecting the use of
land is extinguished whenever the right to enforce the promise and
the obligation upon it come to be in one person.
"(2) In so far as the right to enforce the promise is dependent
upon ownership of an interest in one tract of land and the obligation
to perform It is dependent upon the ownership of an interest In another
tract, the obligation is extinguished by the coming of the two interests
into a single ownership."
On this very question Powell says:
"The existence of a promissory obligation respecting the use of land
necessarily involves one person who is entitled to the benefit and
another who is subject to the burden. Consequently if the same person becomes the owner of both the benefited and the burdened land
unity of ownership extinguishes the obligation by means of the doctrine of merger." POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1956)
206.
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clear from any legal effect of the recorded restrictions. Gnau
could have improved his property in any way he wished,
subject only to the zoning rules and regulations and the
building code of Baltimore County. If the common grantor
was desirous of continuing these restrictive obligations
upon the various lots, they must have been created anew,
since severance of ownership will not cause the onceextinguished covenants to be revived." Therefore, since
there were no binding restrictions on the tract when Gnau
resumed ownership, and since the deed to lots 1 and 2
made no reference to these restrictive covenants, the present owners of lots 1 and 2 would normally have no standing as complainants to enforce the restrictions.
On the other hand, when the deed to lots 5 and 6 was
executed, the restrictive covenants had been recreated by
Gnau in his sale of lots 7 and 8 subject to the restrictive
covenants set forth in the deed from Gnau to the straw
man. Therefore, at this point, lots 7 and 8 became subject
to these restrictions, but the subsequent deed to lots 5 and
6 made no similar reference to these restrictive covenants.
This raises the problem whether the doctrine of implied
reciprocal servitudes is operative in this case to confer
upon the owners of lots 5 and 6 any legal interest in the
enforcement of the restrictions. To do so it must be determined whether the common grantor effectively created
anew uniform restrictions on all of the remaining lots by
virtue of the incorporation of such restrictive covenants
in the deed to lots 7 and 8.
The case of Turner v. Brocato2 held the doctrine of implied reciprocal servitudes to be applicable in Maryland.
In order for this doctrine to be operative, it must be proved,
among other things, that a general plan of development
existed at the time of the conveyance in question. Whether
restrictions in prior deeds were part of a general scheme
is to be determined by ascertaining the intention of the
parties, as gathered from words used, interpreted in light
of all circumstances and pertinent facts known to the parties,'8 and the burden of showing such a general scheme

1 3 TIFFANY,

LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939) 509, §870; 5 PowmLx,
683; 5 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1944)
§555, comment c.
"206 Md. 336, 111 A. 2d 855 (1955), noted 16 Md. L. Rev. 51 (1956).
"Scholtes v. McColgan, 184 Md. 480, 41 A. 2d 479 (1945); Schlicht v.
Wengert, 178 Md. 629, 15 A. 2d 911 (1940) ; Club Manor v. Oheb Shalom
Cong., 211 Md. 465, 128 A. 2d 405 (1957); McKendrick v. Savings Bank,
THE LAW OF REAL 'PROPERTY (1956)
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is on the party seeking to enforce the restrictions. 4 This
burden is extremely difficult to meet in Maryland for our
courts have rigidly enforced a presumption resolving all
doubts in favor of the free and unrestricted use of land.15 It
seems most unreasonable in the principal case to say that
a uniform plan existed when lots 5 and 6 were purchased,
at which time only two out of five previously sold lots
were subject to restrictions, and if this reasoning is followed, then the owners of lots 5 and 6 also were not proper
complainants and only the owners of lots 3 and 4 had any
standing in court based on the express restrictions imposed in the deed of their lots. If they had not joined in
the suit, it is submitted that it would have been proper
to have denied the injunction.
The above discussion indicates the problems which may
arise out of the practice of land developers of subjecting
their tract to restrictive covenants by way of a straw man
conveyance, and the importance of referring to these restrictions in a sufficient number of deeds, especially the
first deeds of the subdivided lots, in order to prevent the
doctrine of merger from extinguishing such restrictions.
There is merit, however, to this transaction between
the common grantor and the straw man, for after the intention of the developer to subject the tract to uniform restrictions is sufficiently proved to rebut the presumption
of the free and unrestricted use of property, it is then
necessary to prove only that the transferee was on actual
or constructive notice of the restrictions, or was put on
inquiry and reasonable inquiry would have led to knowl174 Md. 118, 197 A. 580 (1938) ; 26 C.J.S., Deeds, 1147. §167 (2), text at
fn. 34.
"Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336, 111 A. 2d 855 (1955), noted 16 Md.
L. Rev. 51 (1956), Norris v. Williams, 189 Md. 73, 54 A. 2d 331, 4 A.L.R.
2d 1106 (1947); McKendrick v. Savings Bank, 174 Md. 118, 197 A. 580
(1938).
15The principle that doubt must be resolved in favor of the alienability
of land, free and unfettered, does not control if clear and satisfactory
evidence is persented to prove the existence of a general plan of development, for, wherever possible, effect will be given to an ascertained Intention
of the parties. To prove such the enforcing party must present evidence
showing (1) ,the intent of the common grantor to develop the land according to a general plan, (2) that such intent was carried out, (3) that the
common grantor intended to include in the development the property against
which enforcement is sought, (4) that, knowing of this intent to develop,
he relied upon representations of the common grantor that like restrictions
would be inserted in subsequent deeds, and (5) that the parties purchased
with at least constructive notice of the restrictions. 16 Md. L. Rev. 51,
56-57 (1956).

1959]

VLAMIS v. DE WEESE

edge of the same.1 6 The rule in Maryland that a grantee
is bound by express encumbrances on his property which
could be found by use of the grantor-grantee index of the
land records, even though appearing in deeds not in the
direct chain of title, is a harsh one. 7 However, the practice
of subjecting the entire tract to restrictions by means of
a straw man conveyance eliminates the harshness of such
a rule, for each purchaser will discover the restrictions in
his direct chain of title. Although this practice may involve many problems, as shown above, it does serve the
purpose of conclusively satisfying the requirement of constructive notice.
HOWARD J. NEEDLE

Partnership Realty And Its Treatment Under The
Uniform Partnership Act
Vlamis v. De Weese'
In 1921 Malin bought certain real property in Elkton
and erected a building thereon. In 1921 he conveyed a half
interest in said property to Deibert as a tenant in common,
and the two parties thereafter held the property and operated the premises as a garage and new car dealership.
Deibert died late in 1922 and left all his property, personal
and real, to his wife for life, remainder to his daughter.
Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678, 93 A. 216 (1915) ; Coomes v. Aero Theatre
Etc., 207 Md. 432, 114 A. 2d 631 (1955); King v. Walgand, 208 Md. 308,
311, 117 A, 2d 918 (1955) ; Easton v. The Careybrook Co., 210 Md. 286, 123
A. 2d 342 (1956) ; 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939) §863.
1"Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678, 93 A. 216 (1915). The case of Turner
v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336, 356, 111 A. 2d 855 (1955), noted 16 Md. L. Rev.
51 (1956), extended this rule to the effect that it raises the implication
that 'the common grantor intended to restrict the entire development, assuming the existence of a general plan. This, it is felt, places an unreasonable burden upon title searchers, especially in Baltimore City. It Is to
be noted that in the counties of Maryland the grantor-grantee index recording system is employed, which clearly discloses 'the earlier conveyances by the common grantor of the other lots in the subdivision which
do contain express restrictions. Even then it is a considerable burden to
a title searcher to require him to search for restrictions in all other conveyances from -the common grantor in the subdivision, In order to make an
accurate title report. But in Baltimore City the block index recording
system is employed, which would make it extremely difficult for a title
searcher to ever discover conveyances to all of the other lots in a large
subdivision. How would he find conveyances to lots across the street or
in an adjoining block? It would be necessary for him to search his title
by the grantor-grantee method, reading restrictions in 'all the deeds from
the common grantor. Should the common grantor 'be a land developer, the
title searcher would clearly be faced with an intolerable burden.
1216 Md. 384, 140 A. 2d 665 (1958).

